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The Arab Spring started the fire in 2011, and ever since the whole MENA region has been in turmoil. The civil war in
Syria has quickly become a global one with the ongoing war
against the Islamic State (ISIL)–a terror organization and a self-
proclaimed state at the same time— on the one hand, and the
refugee crisis, on the other. The war against ISIL largely
continues in the global sphere, with the involvement of the
United States, Russia, Iran, the Gulf States, and Israel with
geopolitical aims in the region. The refugee crisis, meanwhile, is
a major issue to tackle primarily for neighboring countries like
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as European countries.
The number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has increased from an
estimated 25,000 in 2011 to nearly  3 million in 2016. The
number of asylum applications from Syrians in European
countries was 25,665 in 2012, and this number increased to
104,300 for 2016. At the end of June 2016, there were almost 1.1 million pending applications for asylum protection
in the EU member states. Between March 2011 and March 2016, 250,000 people died in the Syrian war. So far in
2016, 414 people have lost their lives as they were trying to cross the Aegean Sea, 366 of them before the Turkey-
EU deal. The living conditions for those who made it to Turkey or Greece are also worrying.
One year ago German Chancellor Angela Merkel appeared on
TV show Anne Will and announced her plan for the refugee
issue, which depended not only on Germany but also on Turkey.
Merkel’s plan originally belonged to the European Stability
Initiative (ESI) and its founding chairman Gerald Knaus. This
initial plan included asylum grants for some 500,000 Syrian
refugees in one year. It suggested that not only Germany but
also other European states should accept claims for asylum
directly from Turkey to avoid unsafe routes, Turkey should take
back immigrants who made it to Greece in order to discourage
people to cross the Aegean via smugglers, and that Germany
should help Turkey to achieve visa liberalization.
Clearly, Merkel saw Turkey as a key partner in dealing with this refugee crisis, but she had to convince her
European counterparts, too. Despite the ESI’s insistance “to move quickly” in implementing their plan, “the
European leaders handed over responsibility to the notoriously slow-moving and less influential European
Commission.” Merkel convinced the EU to take joint action in solving the refugee crisis. The Turkey-EU Deal was
finally formulated almost half a year later when Merkel announced her version of the plan on March 18, 2016. But
the main trick was in the implementation of this plan. In their policy brief in June 2016, Toygür and Benvenuti were
already hinting at major problems and a potential Plan B in dealing with the refugee crisis.
Since this deal, in addition, the referendum in Britain has resulted with the “Brexit” decision, the Alternative for
Deutschland (AfD) gained more seats in the German state parliament, and a coup attempt took place in Turkey
allegedly orchestrated by the religious cleric Fethullah Gülen. In the aftermath of this coup attempt, the already
tense relationship between the West and Turkey became further rigid, with rising skepticism from both sides on the
1/5
political and societal levels.
In light of the current framework, this article briefly overviews the process of implementing the Turkey-EU Deal and
its future. What has been promised by both parties, and what has been done in this past year? The article concludes
with a tentative answer to the question of what should be done by considering potential future scenarios and inviting
policy makers and the public to realize that the main issue at hand is the Syrian refugee issue.
What has been promised?
In the framework of the EU-Turkey deal, Turkey agreed to accept the rapid return of all migrants not in need of
international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in
Turkish waters. Stepping up measures against migrant smugglers and welcoming the establishment of the NATO
activity on the Aegean Sea were also agreed on. [1] Moreover, there is a claim that individuals who submit asylum
claims but are determined to have arrived from a country where they had or could have claimed protection (a “safe
third country” or “first country of asylum,” the EU criteria for which include the right to non-refoulement [2] and the
ability to both request and receive protection) are considered inadmissible to the EU and eligible for return.
In September 2015, the European Commission (EC) adopted a temporary and exceptional relocation mechanism
for 106,000 people from Greece and Italy, which put member states under pressure for managing continued
exceptional flows. Anticipating the shortcomings of this principle, there was a need for an alternative policy. The EU-
Turkey Deal developed a mechanism called “one for one”, meaning one Syrian refugee from Turkey would be
resettled in Europe for every one refugee that is readmitted to Turkey.
According to the deal, the EU would further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated three billion euros
under the ‘Facility for Refugees in Turkey’, which manages humanitarian assistance for refugees in Turkey on
diverse matters including education, health, municipal infrastructure and other socio-economic projects. Once these
resources are used to the full advantage of the refugees by Turkey, the EU would mobilize additional funding for the
Facility of an additional three billion euro up to the end of 2018.[3]
In the framework of the agreement, the EU also pledged to reenergize Turkey’s bid for membership in the EU and lift
visa restrictions on Turkish tourists and businessmen. In return, Turkey is required to meet the seventy-two criteria
drawn by the EC. According to the EC report on May 4, 2016, five of the criteria needed further work from Turkey.
These were 1) to implement the National Strategy and the Action Plan on the Fight against Corruption and the
recommendations of GRECO; 2) to provide effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters; 3) to implement an
Operational Cooperation Agreement with EUROPOL, 4) to align legislation on personal data protection with EU
standards and and 5) to implement the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement in all its provisions and to revise
legislation and practices on terrorism in line with European standards. However, Turkey does not consider the fifth
criterium as a part of the deal and replaces  “to issue biometric travel documents fully compatible” as it is fulfilled by
Turkey. The element on terrorism remains under controversy, along with other problems, as the next section will
explain.
What has been done?
Since the deal was implemented, Turkey continued to receive more refugees from Syria. According to the
legalization process, Turkey also receives those returning from Greece and provides formal guarantees that all
Syrian refugees returning to Turkey from the Greek islands may request and be granted protection under the
temporary protection regulation in Turkey. With this, the casualties and injuries have subsided, and smuggling
activities through the Aegean Sea dropped significantly.
Meanwhile, as refugees increasingly arrived on the shores of Greece, the EU remained reluctant to implement the
relocation of asylum seekers. Thousands of refugees continue to live in challenging conditions while waiting for their
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asylum applications.[4] According to the fact sheet published in June by the EC, it is already recognized that the
relocation program falls short of fulfilling the fundamental aim of the deal. By June 10, the total number of persons
relocated from Greece was 1,503, although this number was designed to be 6,000 people per month. The EU failed
to provide sufficient assistance to Greece and also Italy, which are the two countries of first arrival.
According to EC’s sixth report  on relocation and resettlement, a total of 1,614 persons have been resettled from
Turkey to the EU countries under the 1:1 mechanism since the Turkey-EU Deal in March 2016, doubling the number
in the previous report published on July 13. Still, there are shortcomings with the implementation of this mechanism.
Since the implementation of the deal, 578 refugees have returned from the Greek islands to Turkey, including only
53 Syrians.
The coup attempt on July 15 gave rise to additional security measures in Turkey. Under the state of emergency law,
Turkey also remained reluctant to cooperate with the deal as it dismissed related officials from the EU, more
precisely from Greece. Thus, Turkey failed to return migrants not in need of international protection crossing from
Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. NGOs such as Human
Rights Watch and the UN Refugee Agency have reported breaching of the Geneva Convention and the EU
legislation in the deportation of Syrians to Turkey.[5] Furthermore, in its report on May 19, 2016, Amnesty
International has declared that there were violations of human rights in Turkey and that “Turkey cannot be
considered a safe country for refugees right now” [6]. The national appeals committees in Greece also issued
decisions rejecting the return of Syrian refugees to Turkey, claiming that it is not a safe country (ibid, 4). On
September 28, 2016, the EC described seven benchmarks that remain to be met in order for visa liberalization to
take place. As mentioned above, there is an ongoing ambiguity whether one criteria is going to be fulfilled, which is
“Turkey revises its legislation and practices on terrorism in line with European standards.” Just recently, on October
19, Minister of EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik stressed that Turkey would not make changes in its terror
laws, saying, “Asking Turkey to change its anti-terrorism law is putting the security of the country at risk as well as
that of Europe.”
There has been a major controversy on whether the initial three billion euros was allocated or not. On October 3,
President Erdoğan highlighted the gap between what the EU promised to Turkey and what it actually paid, saying:
“What’s delivered to us so far is 179 million euros. What’s promised is three billion euros… The year is coming to its
end.” However, the report of the European Commission, which was updated on October 3, 2016, states that “2,239
billion euros have so far been allocated … 1,252 billion euros have been contracted … 467 million euros have been
disbursed to date.” From the beginning of the refugee crisis until today, Turkey claims that it has spent over 12 billion
euros on Syrian refugees in Turkey.
What should be done?
The most optimistic comment about the current situation of the Turkey-EU deal would be to describe it as “fragile.” In
fact, many people openly claim that the deal may collapse due to the abovementioned gap between the deal and its
practice.
The Turkish government, as well as President Erdoğan himself, openly blame Europe for not keeping its promises
on the financial support for Syrian refugees in Turkey and the visa liberalization issue. Xenophobia is on the rise
across Europe and populist parties are “stoking anti-immigrant fears.” Some favor Europe’s abandoning of the deal
and not allowing itself “to be bullied by an increasingly tyrannical state.” Emphasizing the benefits of this deal for
both parties involved, Merkel has said that “almost no one has drowned in the Aegean Sea” since the deal and
described the anti-immigrant AfD as “a challenge not only for the Christian Democrats … [but also] a threat to the
values of society”.
What might happen if the Turkey-EU deal really collapses? Scenarios are not very pleasant. The ESI’s newsletter in
October 2016 predicts some scenarios that are not very pleasant. Based on their scenario, as the number of illegal
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immigrants rise in the Greek islands, Greek authorities will be forced to send more and more people from the islands
to the mainland. With this, more people will want to cross the Aegean to get to Europe with the hope of eventually
reaching Western Europe. Of course, smugglers will be aware of this and will take advantage of this increasing flow.
Turkey will blame the EU for this humanitarian crisis, and Europe will blame Greece, potentially pushing for building
a wall in northern Greece to avoid flows through the Balkan route. Greece, already having the biggest share of the
refugee crisis in Europe, will feel left alone. Consequently, “the Western Balkans [will] turn into a battleground for
migrants, smugglers, border guards, soldiers and vigilante groups, destabilizing an already fragile region.”
Knaus highlights that the Turkey-EU deal has to be put into concrete action in order to avoid disastrous outcomes.
The ESI has made several further recommendations for the Turkey-EU deal to be successfully implemented with a
the same newspaper: (1) increasing and more efficient involvement of the EU Asylum Missions in support of the
Greek officers via sending case workers, interpreters, and reception officers; (2) a working relocation scheme within
the EU to act in solidarity with Greece and Italy and share the economic and humanitarian burdens; (3) Turkey’s
committed cooperation with the EU, UNHCR or an independent Ombudsperson to verify itself as a third safe-
country; (4) a better communication not only between the EU and Turkey in the governmental level but also among
the host communities, overall public, media and organizations working on the ground.
Other recommendations can be made with respect to the
Turkey-EU Deal. First, the difference between the EU and
Turkey legal standards on refugees causes significant problems
for the implementation of the 1:1 mechanism. Greece is not only
returning Syrian refugees to Turkey but also sends refugees
with different nationalities. However, the Turkish legislation for
refugees does not match with the Geneva Convention. Rather, it
either gives a temporary protection status only to Syrians or a
right to international protection to everyone else. Collett warns
that “the EU leaders would be making a calculated risk” and in
order this mechanism to work, both the EU and Turkey should
share a universal protection framework for refugees.
Second, it is important to highlight that Turkish and European politicians should not use this humanitarian crisis as a
political tool. The rise of xenophobia and nationalism is a threat both for Turkey and the EU and there needs to be
stronger political narrative that highlights inclusion rather than exclusion in dealing with the refugee crisis. Following
the Paris attacks in September 2015, President Hollande announced that France would welcome 30,000 more
refugees in the following two year period, “’ignoring the elements of fear”. Such inclusionary attitude is much needed
in an increasingly polarizing politics. Not only politicians but societies can also benefit from backchannel processes
to ease the exclusionary narratives.
The European Union is facing an institutional crisis. There is rising xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe,
threatening the core values of the EU, such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and
respect, for human rights. This threat is not limited to the EU but it also affects Turkey, a country that much needs
the EU’s guidance and support on good governance. As the EU loses its role and credibility as an anchor for
democracy and human rights for Turkey, we see a rising euro-skepticsm and anti-Westernism in Turkey. In order to
avoid this intolerance, there needs to be continuous dialogue, joint work and mutual trust between the two parties.
Perhaps, the ultimate question that needs to be answered is the flowing: What was the ultimate purpose of this
deal? Was it for Europe to keep illegal/irregular migrants outside, was it for Turkey to gain visa liberalization, or was
it the Syrian refugees themselves? Or, was it all three, as is likely. All in all, it takes commitment from both the EU
and Turkey to commit to work on these challenges to avoid more chaos not only in the national and institutional
levels, but perhaps most importantly on the public and humanitarian levels.
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